В США усиливается изоляционизм

Американские СМИ бьют тревогу: в современной Америке усиливаются изоляционистские настроения. Подавляющее большинство американцев выступают против нанесения военного удара по Сирии, они вообще – против втягивания их страны в новые конфликты за рубежом, в тех случаях, когда безопасности их страны ничто не угрожает.

[learn_more caption="О чем идет речь - Американские СМИ бьют тревогу (англ)"]

'We'll be lucky to get 80 Republicans out of 230." That's an astute GOP congressman's best guess for how his caucus now stands on the vote to authorize military force against Syria.

At town hall meetings in their districts, the congressman reports, House Republicans are hearing "an isolationist message." It's not America's war. The evidence that the Assad regime used chemical weapons is ambiguous, maybe cooked. There isn't a compelling national interest to intervene. "Let Allah sort it out." We'd be coming in on the side of al Qaeda. The strike serves symbolic, not strategic, purposes. There's no endgame. It would be another Iraq.

Or, to quote Sean Hannity in all his profundity, it would be "the next world war."

There's also the trust issue. "Why should I go out on a limb to help this president?" The this in that question, as House Republicans ask it, means Benghazi and Susan Rice, the IRS and Lois Lerner, the NSA and James Clapper. It means a president for whom all policy is partisanship, including the referral to Congress.

"Big move by POTUS," former Obama spinmeister David Axelrod tweeted over the weekend. "Consistent with his principles. Congress is now the dog that caught the car." Thanks, David, for that conciliating image to win over fence-sitting Republicans.

Most Republicans don't want to become, again, the party of isolationists. Not consciously at any rate. Nearly all of them profess fidelity to a strong military, to Israel's security, to stopping Iran's march to a bomb. And opposition to military intervention in Syria—particularly if it's of the pinprick sort being contemplated by the administration—isn't necessarily proof of isolationist sympathies. Henry Kissinger is opposed to intervening in Syria. Henry Kissinger is not, last I checked, an isolationist.

Yet the Syria debate is also exposing the isolationist worm eating its way through the GOP apple. Thus:

"The war in Syria has no clear national security connection to the United States and victory by either side will not necessarily bring into power people friendly to the United States." Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.).

"I believe the situation in Syria is not an imminent threat to American national security and, therefore, I do not support military intervention. Before taking action, the president should first come present his plan to Congress outlining the approach, cost, objectives and timeline, and get authorization from Congress for his proposal." Sen. Mike Lee (R., Utah).

"When the United States is not under attack, the American people, through our elected representatives, must decide whether we go to war." Rep. Justin Amash (R., Mich.)

Such faux-constitutional assertions—based on the notion that only direct attacks to the homeland constitute an actionable threat to national security—would have astonished Ronald Reagan, who invaded Grenada in 1983 without consulting a single member of Congress. It would have amazed George H.W. Bush, who gave Congress five hours notice before invading Panama. And it would have flabbergasted the Republican caucus of, say, 2002, which understood it was better to take care of threats over there rather than wait for them to arrive right here.

Then again, the views of Messrs. Paul, Lee and Amash would have sat well with Sen. Robert Taft of Ohio (1889-1953), son of a president, a man of unimpeachable integrity, high principles, probing intelligence—and unfailing bad judgment.

A history lesson: In April 1939, the man known as Mr. Republican charged that "every member of the government . . . is ballyhooing the foreign situation, trying to stir up prejudice against this country or that, and at all costs take the minds of the people off their trouble at home." By "this country or that," Taft meant Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The invasion of Poland was four months away.

Another history lesson: After World War II, Republicans under the leadership of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg joined Democrats to support the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, and the Marshall Plan. But not Robert Taft. He opposed NATO as a threat to U.S. sovereignty, a provocation to Russia, and an undue burden on the federal fisc.

"Can we afford this new project of foreign assistance?" he asked in 1949. "I am as much against Communist aggression as anyone. . . but we can't let them scare us into bankruptcy and the surrender of all liberty, or let them determine our foreign policies." Substitute "Islamist" for "Communist" in that sentence, and you have a Rand Paul speech.

Which brings us to another isolationist idea: that what we do abroad takes away from what we have, and can spend, at home. When Barack Obama claims, dishonestly, that the cost of foreign wars is guilty of "helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at home," he is sounding this theme. So is Mr. Paul when he demagogues against foreign aid by insisting that "while we are trying in vain to nation build across the globe, our nation is crumbling here at home."

Republicans should know that deficits are exploding not because of military spending or foreign aid—as a percentage of GDP, George W. Bush spent less on defense in 2008 than Jimmy Carter did in 1980—but because of the growth of entitlement programs. Republicans should know, too, that investing in global order deters more dangerous would-be aggressors and creates a world congenial to American trade, security and values. One cost-effective way of doing that is making an example of a thug who flouts U.S. warnings and civilized conventions.

Taft couldn't understand this when it came to the dictators of his day. Neither does Mr. Paul when it comes to the dictators of today. The junior senator from Kentucky may not know it yet, but, intellectually speaking, he's already yesterday's man. Republicans follow him at their peril.



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Доктрина «гуманитарного интервенционизма» не находит никакой поддержки у простых американцев, а военная резолюция в поддержку удара по Сирии имеет все шансы быть заблокированной в Палате представителей. В Республиканской партии, которая еще недавно считалась оплотом наиболее агрессивной части американского истеблишмента, резко усиливается «изоляционистское крыло», а ее неформальный лидер сенатор от штата Кентукки Рэнд Пол имеет сегодня все шансы победить на республиканских праймериз в 2016 году.

[learn_more caption="О чем идет речь - имеет сегодня все шансы победить на республиканских праймериз (англ)"]

The first nine months of 2013 have convinced us of one thing: Rand Paul acts, and the rest of the potential 2016 Republican presidential field reacts.

On drones, the senator from Kentucky led a 13-hour filibuster that drew Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), among others, to the floor in support. On Syria, Paul was out front in his opposition to a military strike — a position that more than two dozen of his Republican Senate colleagues came to share.

Paul, in short, seems to be a step or two in front of the ongoing transformation of the Republican Party from a hawkish conservatism to a sort of populist libertarianism.

That’s not to say, of course, that significant strains of resistance to the vision of the Republican Party that Paul is offering don’t remain. They do. And it remains to be seen whether the establishment, such as it is — elected officials and major donors, primarily — can unite to keep Paul from the nomination in favor of a politically “safer” choice such as Rubio or New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie.

And Paul, as he showed with his civil rights comments during his 2010 Senate campaign in Kentucky, holds some controversial views that can — and will — get him into trouble in the glare of the national spotlight.

But anyone who laughs at Paul as a serious contender, dismisses him as just a carbon copy of his father — former representative Ron Paul (R-Tex.) — or otherwise writes him off would do well to study the year in politics so far. No one in the GOP has had a better year than Paul. And it’s not all that close.

Below are our rankings of the 10 candidates with the best chance of winding up as the Republican presidential nominee. While this should go without saying, making predictions in 2013 about 2016 is something short of purely scientific.

10. Mike Pence: The Indiana governor is flying way under the radar at the moment, but he has the makings of a potential 2016 dark horse. Social and fiscal conservatives like him, he’s a charismatic communicator and, perhaps most important, he doesn’t work in Washington.

9. John Kasich: The Ohio governor’s poll numbers have recovered remarkably well from his first few years in office, and he now looks like a modest favorite for reelection against much-touted Democratic nominee Ed FitzGerald. If Kasich wins in 2014, he has a case to make as a swing-state Midwestern governor who previously served as the chairman of the House Budget Committee and who ran, albeit briefly, for president in 2000.

8. Bobby Jindal: We believe that Jindal’s stock was probably a bit too high a year ago and is now a bit too low. His numbers in Louisiana still aren’t great, but they are better than earlier this year. Jindal’s decision to reject Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act will be a feather in his cap among conservative presidential-primary voters.

7. Scott Walker : The Wisconsin governor may have a bit more of a reelection race on his hands than he originally thought with wealthy former Trek executive Mary Burke running for the Democratic nomination. And we hear from reliable Wisconsin sources that Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) is more interested in running than we believed. If Ryan runs, it’s hard to see Walker also getting in.



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Многие обозреватели говорят, что политическая линия Рэнда Пола и его единомышленников представляет собой возрождение «старого изоляционизма», символом которого был знаменитый сенатор от штата Огайо Роберт Альфонсо Тафт (1889-1953 годы), сын президента Уильяма Тафта. Роберт Тафт активно выступал против вовлечения США во вторую мировую войну, а впоследствии критически относился к созданию блока НАТО и вооруженной поддержке антикоммунистических режимов в Европе и Азии.

[learn_more caption="О чем идет речь - представляет собой возрождение старого изоляционизма (англ)"]

In the article which follows, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,National Vice Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action, raises a question which has been troubling many independent voters: Is Senator Taft an isolationist? Mr. Schlesinger, an Associate Professor of History at Harvard, is an Ohioan who grew up in an academic family which migrated from Ohio State University to the University of Iowa and finally to Harvard. His book, The Age of Jackson, which appeared after his return from the Army, was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in American History for 1945. In 1949 he authored a credo for liberals in The Vital Center.

by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

Early this year, when new crisis seemed to impend in Asia, the American people were exposed to an edifying exercise in the discussion of foreign policy. As Chinese troops massed on the Indo-Chinese border, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio spoke before a Lincoln Day banquet in Seattle, Washington. Barely mentioning the first Republican President, in whose honor the banquet was given, Taft addressed himself to the Far Eastern crisis. "Now that a Communist assault in southeast Asia is on the horizon," he said, "it should be clear to our government that the only chance to stop it is by a Chinese Nationalist invasion of Communist-held territory. An invasion, well organized, might snowball rapidly." He went on to express his disdain for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to announce his intention, after January 20, 1953, of placing General Douglas MacArthur in a position of high, if unspecified, military authority.

The next day, at Portland, Oregon, that Senator both strengthened and weakened his China policy. It was "the most idiotic thing in the world not to use the Nationalist troops," he said, adding anticlimactically, "at least for diversionary purposes." By this time Taft's grand strategy had begun to alarm certain fellow Republicans. Governor Warren of California demurred, and Senator Morse of Oregon flatly denounced "the ugly proposal on the part of this growing war clique in the United States that we commit an act which constitutes for the first time in American history an aggressive act of war." In the next few days, Senator Taft retreated behind a barrage of explanations. He hadn't meant an invasion of the Chinese mainland, he said; he had meant diversionary raids against the mainland and an invasion of such "Communist-held territory" as the island of Hainan (from which the invasion would presumably "snowball rapidly" into the Gulf of Tonkin). And he hadn't meant this as a means of stopping in advance a Communist invasion of Indo-China--an impression which unwary readers drew from his Seattle speech. "I would not advocate an invasion of China," he soon said at Pocatello, Idaho, "unless the Communist Chinese move into Indo-China." He was still prepared, however, to advocate action by ourselves in defiance of our allies.

Except for his faith in unilateral action Senator Taft had now whittled his original belligerence down to a position indistinguishable from that of Dean Acheson and Anthony Eden, both of whom had warned Peking that entry into the Indo-Chinese War would bring retaliation. But more was to come. By the time the Senator got to Denver, he said that, while he favored sending arms to the threatened states of southeast Asia, "under no circumstances, unless we were absolutely sure of winning, would I send American forces to that area." Suppose the Chinese Communist assault came and no absolute guarantee of victory (a rare thing in any war, and highly unlikely in a war against Communist China) was forthcoming; would he then help these nations? "No," said the Senator, "they would just have to fall."

Robert A. Taft is a man of high ability and considerable intelligence. His confusions are not to be explained simply in terms of campaign oratory. There is something deeper here--some essential perplexity of a powerful mind confounded by events which he cannot quite fit into a consistent scheme of interpretation. Senator Taft, indeed, is a man in transition, an Old Isolationist trying hard to come to terms with the modern world.

As doctrine and as program, Senator Taft's isolationism of a decade ago is surely dead. But the Old Isolationism was, of course, far more than doctrine and program. It was, above all, a set of intense emotions--emotions deeply founded in the American experience and sharply etched on the American psychology. And, in this deeper sense, isolationism has never died. The events of 1939-45 destroyed the doctrine and the program of the Old Isolationism, but they did not destroy the emotions which underlay and sustained it. In the last six months, the old emotions have begun to generate new doctrines and programs. Today we face a New Isolationism, bent upon what promises to be a fundamental attack on the foreign policy to which the United States and the free world are presently committed.

The internationalist euphoria of the past decade should not lead us to overlook the deep roots which isolationism has in the national consciousness. Americans have always had a natural and splendid exultation in the uniqueness of a new continent and a new society. The New World had been called into existence to redress the moral as well as the diplomatic balance of the Old; we could not defile the sacredness of our national mission by too careless intercourse with the world whose failure made our own necessary. Two great oceans fostered the sense of distance, emphasized the tremendous act of faith involved in emigration, and, at the same time, spared the new land the necessity for foreign involvements.

The resulting isolationism--this passionate sense of a unique national destiny--was, in the beginning, a generous and affirmative faith. We were, as Lincoln said, dedicated to a proposition; we were engaged in a fateful experiment. America was conceived to be perfect, not in achievement, but in opportunity. Our responsibility was not to be complacent about what we had done, but to rise to the challenge of what there was for us to do. Our nation had been commissioned--whether by God or by history--to work out on this remote hemisphere the best hopes and dreams of men. Isolation was a means, not of confining, but of releasing democratic energy. This was the isolationism of the younger George Norris, of the early Hiram Johnson, of the Robert La Follettes.

But American isolationism did not consist only in an affirmation of the uniqueness of America; it also included--and increasingly so--a rejection of Europe. In a sense, of course, the very act of migration had represented an extraordinary act of rejection. "Repudiation of Europe," Dos Passos once said, "is, after all, America's main excuse for being." Nor could such repudiation be without passion. America's love-hate relationship with Europe has dominated our politics as well as our literature. As European struggles began to force themselves on the American attention, isolationism began to react with ever more explicit hostility and even hatred. An image of Europe began to haunt the isolationist consciousness--an image of a dark and corrupt continent, teeming with insoluble feuds, interminable antagonisms; senseless and malevolent wars. Europe was morally and politically diseased and scabrous; and contact with it would bring the risk of fatal infection. No one defined this image with more precision and loathing than Herbert Hoover:--

"Here are four hundred million people on the continent divided into twenty-six races. They are crowded cheek by jowl in an area less than two-thirds of the United States. Suppose each of twenty-six of our states had its own language, its own racial inheritance, its own economic and political problems. And suppose through all these races for centuries have surged the forces of nationalism, of imperialism, of religious conflict, memories of deep wrongs, of age-old hates, and bitter fears. Suppose each had its own army and around each of these states was a periphery of mixed populations that made exact boundaries on racial lines hopeless. The outcries of separated minorities would be implacable and unceasing cause of war. Suppose they all had different forms of government and even where it was a democratic form it was class government. That would be Europe....
And periodically there boils up among these people some Pied Piper with silver tongue, calling some new Utopia....With a vicious rhythm these malign forces seem to drive nations like the Gadarene swine over the precipice of war."

In contrast, said Hoover, we in America have grown steadily apart from the ideas of Europe. "Freed of European hates and fears...we have developed new concepts of liberty, of morals and government." We must at all cost save ourselves from what he called, in a savage phrase, "the eternal malign forces of Europe."

In time, the old affirmative isolationism of Norris and La Follette began to give way before the negative isolationism of Hoover. The one was moved by hope for America, the other by hatred of Europe. The one shunned Europe the better to change America, the other, the better to keep America from changing. The one sprang from American progressivism--from a belief that the American experiment was unfinished; the other, from American conservatism--from a belief that American society was complete, and that change meant not progress but disaster. In the end, the abandonment of isolationism by men like Norris before the Second War, and the younger La Follette after, testified to their conclusion that its affirmative possibilities had been exhausted.

The progressive and hopeful form of isolationism thus came to a natural end. What remained was a petulant desire to seal off America from the winds of change which were blowing through the world. And even this conservative isolationism seemed increasingly irrelevant as a basis for national policy. The Second War itself apparently provided a conclusive demonstration of this obsolescence. For a time, we were all--or nearly all--internationalists. Thus the Harold Stassen of 1943 presented a detailed plan for world government--the same Harold Stassen who today opposes association with any nation which declines to swear eternal loyalty to the capitalistic system. In this mood, the isolationist doctrine and program perished; and even the underlying emotions succumbed for a season to feelings of guilt and went underground. But these emotions only went underground; they did not die.

The queer complex of feeling, fear, and prejudice was too deep to be repealed in a decade. The emotional core of the Old Isolationism survived--the hatred of Europe and its age-old troubles; the belief in an American purity which should not risk corruption in contact with outsiders; the agoraphobic fear of a larger world; the old, cherished, wistful hope that we could continue to live of ourselves and by ourselves. And, underground, these emotions have continued to exercise a paralyzing effect on policy. More than anything else, perhaps, they have kept America a slumbering giant, unable to export its democratic faith to the peoples of other nations, unable to play a full and affirmative role in the world.

In time, a new isolationist formulation was bound to come--a new triangulation by which the old emotions would try to make terms with the new realities and issue in the form of up-to-date doctrine and program. But the struggle for a new formulation was confused and difficult. Herbert Hoover, whose Old Isolationist fundamentalism has resisted every temptation of novelty, set off one phase of the discussion with his speech of December, 1950. General MacArthur, who never was an Old Isolationist, set off another with his speeches following his recall in April, 1951. At every stage, the confusions were registered with seismographic accuracy in the stream of consciousness of the ordinarily logical Senator Taft--as in his singular speech of April, 1951, when he demanded a cut in the size of projected military forces, a reduction in the military budget, and a more aggressive war in Asia (adding subsequently that our reduced forces should be committed to the protection of the Suez Canal).

In the past few months, however, it has become evident that the travail is over; that the process of crystallization has begun. Today the lineaments of the new faith are at last visible. Senator Taft has written a book on foreign policy. General MacArthur has given a series of able and eloquent speeches. Their many followers have made many other statements. Out of all this it now becomes possible to construct the broad and comprehensive design of the New Isolationism.

The first thing to be observed of the New Isolationism is its rejection of the word "isolationist." Mr. Hoover has even described his policies as the "opposite" of isolationism. "I don't know what they mean by isolationist," Senator Taft says "nobody is an isolationist today....I would say that anybody is an idiot who calls anybody else an isolationist." The fact that much of the New Isolationism emerged under the aegis of General MacArthur made this indignant repudiation of the isolationist name all the more plausible; the General, of course, had been recalled for being far more interventionist than the interventionists.

Indeed, it remains difficult at first glance to reconcile this enthusiasm for General MacArthur with the rest of the New Isolationism. But one is bound to conclude that General MacArthur's defiance of Truman provided the New Isolationists with protective coloration; it gave them an air of deep concern with the outside world. Even more important, perhaps, it provided them with political capital on which no opposition party could resist drawing. But it did not provide them with a serious program. Senator Taft, on the subject of the Far Eastern war, sounded far more like himself when he advocated retreat at Denver than when he advocated advance at Seattle; if he were President, would he really reduce the Arms and then expand the Korean war?

As for Mr. Hoover, who shudders at the commitment of a single American to the "quicksands" of Asia and Europe and believes that Communism "will decay and die of its own poisons," his praise for MacArthur can surely be no more than a sentimental gesture toward his former Chief of Staff. MacArthur's first function has plainly been to provide the New Isolationists with a convenient club with which to beat the Administration. It is, moreover, a club they wield with relish, because an appearance of solicitude for the Far East is a natural outlet for the traditional hatred of Europe. But, if this solicitude is more than appearance, one wonders at the glassy boredom which overtakes the New Isolationists when India is mentioned, or Point Four. Isolationism has always been most interested in the foreign countries that have already been lost to the enemy.

Still, the new Isolationism can actually make out a stronger case against the charge of "isolationism" than just its enthusiasm for MacArthur. This case rests on the fact that, on the surface, its general program does seem much more like the program of President Truman than it does like the Old Isolationism of the America First Committee. Senator Taft has concurred in measures which would have appalled the Taft of a decade ago. His book, in fact, reaches its climax in a seven-point program of his own; and his points are worth consideration. They are: 1) rearmament; 2) economic aid to anti-Communist countries; 3) military aid to anti-Communist countries; 4) warning to the Soviet Union that aggression beyond certain lines will be regarded as a casus belli; 5) sending American troops to nations threatened by or actually under attack; 6) ideological warfare against Communism; 7) subversive war behind the Iron Curtain. Not only do these seven points seem far from old-style isolationism; but each one of them is today--and has been for some time--part of the Truman foreign policy. If we are to take these seven points seriously, they represent me-tooism with a vengeance. No wonder that the Senator felt constrained to add, "There is much more agreement on the general character of the strategy to be adopted than is generally supposed."

But how seriously are we to take these points? The fact that they are imbedded in a book the rest of which is a bitter attack on the Truman foreign policy might raise questions in suspicious minds. And additional evidence is available. As Senator Brien McMahon noted in a skeptical analysis of the Taft book, there are certain oddities about Taft's proprietary claim to these policies. "The first is that as the Administration has proposed each of them to the Congress, Senator Taft has vigorously opposed each of them. The second is that having now stated the policies, Senator Taft immediately proceeds in this and subsequent chapters to make clear that he doesn't really mean it."

Behind the virtuous rejection of the term "isolationist," behind the fa?ade of nominal support for existing policies, the New Isolationism has something quite different in mind. If the present policy can be briefly defined, in President Truman's phrase, as "peace through collective strength against aggression," the New Isolationism boggles at the word "collective," and it recoils from the whole theory of building "situations of strength." Its supreme emotional link with the Old Isolationism, for example, is its dislike of allies and its desire for unilateral action by the United States. "Go it alone," cried General MacArthur in the hearings; and Senator Taft recently added, "The United Nations is an utter failure as a means of preventing aggression. We can never rely on it again." Facts may have destroyed the Old Isolationist policies; it may now be necessary grudgingly to recognize the existence of the world. But, at least, let us not get involved in the worry, expense, and danger of intimate association with other nations.

If the New Isolationism is openly unhappy about "collective" restraint of aggression, it is only slightly less unhappy in its reaction to the whole policy of building strength in the free world. It does not disclaim the objective; but it wants other nations to establish their own strength first in order to prove themselves worthy of American aid (this rule does not apply, however, to Chiang Kai-shek or Franco); and it adds that, in any case, the free world can be built up at half the cost. Hence the persistent campaign to whittle down every proposal for aid to other free nations; any difference, the New Isolationists protest, is a difference in degree, not in principle. Yet differences in degree in this field quickly become differences in principle, as Senator Vandenberg used to demonstrate with his story of the futility of throwing a fifteen-foot rope to a man drowning thirty feet from shore. The New Isolationism is the policy of the fifteen-foot rope.

The difference in degree, of course, is the grudging compromise the Old Isolationist emotions make with the grim realities of 1952. But it is a compromise with these realities, not an acceptance of them. Senator Taft, once again, has given the most lucid expression of the New Isolationist view. "The policy on which all Republicans can unite," he recently said, "is one of all-out opposition to the spread of Communism, recognizing that there is a limit beyond which we cannot go." The editor of the New York Post has dubbed this the all-out, halfway policy. It is the essence of the foreign policy of the New Isolationism.

One must say "of the foreign policy" because foreign policy is not the main concern of the New Isolationism. Indeed, a survey of the New Isolationist literature quickly discloses the conviction that issues of domestic policy, for the United States in 1952, are far more important and fateful than issues of foreign policy. General MacArthur's concern with Korea may have obscured this fact; but it was MacArthur himself who stated the basic premise of the New Isolationism with classic simplicity in his speech last summer to the Massachusetts legislature. "Talk of imminent threat to our national security through the application of external force," he flatly said, "is pure nonsense." Taft has frequently made the same point: "I do not believe it is at all clear that the Russians contemplate a military conquest of the world...I believe they know it is impossible. It would take them at least a hundred years to build up their sea power."

From his military estimate, MacArthur marched on to the obvious conclusion. "It is not of any external threat that I concern myself," he said, "but rather of insidious forces working from within which have already so drastically altered the character of our free institutions...those institutions we proudly called the American way of life." The vital dangers to American freedom and survival, in short, are not external; they are internal. And of the internal dangers, two, it develops, are of decisive importance. One of these dangers is excessive government spending. The other is Communist penetration within our own country.

Government spending, in the New Isolationist view, is the overriding issue of national survival. It makes heavy taxation necessary; and "the unconscionable burden of taxation" in the words of General MacArthur, is destroying the free enterprise system. "It is just as easy to get to socialism by increased taxes," Senator Taft recently remarked, "as it is by the Government taking over industry." Worse than that, government spending brings the threat of inflation; and inflation provides one more pretext for the imposition of government controls. "All-out war and all-out mobilization," as Taft put it, "are an easy method of socializing a country, and that socializing can easily be made permanent." Thus government spending under the pretext of mobilization is the beginning of a perilous road, whose inevitable end is the extinction of free enterprise and the triumph of socialist regimentation.

If government spending is indeed the main threat, if the Soviet threat is "pure nonsense," what possible reason is there except for New Deal doctrine and socialist intrigue to continue spending at our present levels? So let us cut down the budget--at the expense first of economic aid to free nations, then of military aid, then of our military strength. The Chicago Tribune has already drawn the entirely logical conclusion from the MacArthur dictum: "with far less money for defense than has been appropriated, and probably without resort to the draft, this country can feel secure. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not needed for our safety." (This editorial was quoted recently at the UN meeting in Paris with cordial approval by Andrei Vishinsky.)

The spending issue is straightforward enough. The function of the Communist penetration issue is perhaps less immediately obvious, but on a moment's reflection it too becomes perfectly clear. The problem the New Isolationism faces is to disguise the awkward fact that, as we cut our outlays for foreign aid, we retreat, step by step, from the world wide fight against Communism. This fact has been favorably noted in Moscow, where the New Isolationist attacks on American policy received grateful editorial comment. On February 2, for example, Pravda gave nearly one quarter of its valuable space, ordinarily reserved for pietistic letters to Stalin from factory workers or collective farmers, to the most recent speech of Mr. Hoover, praising him for his attack on United States foreign policy. In a New Year's review of the crisis in American foreign policy, Pravda could happily invoke Joseph P. Kennedy, William Philip Simms of the Scripps-Howard press, Karl H. Von Wiegand of the Hearst press, David Lawrence, the Wall Street Journal, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.

How are the New Isolationists to get around the fact that their proposals are greeted with loud cheers in the Kremlin? Somehow they must cover their retreat; and what better way to do so than by raising a great outcry about the supposed dangers of Communism within our own country? Such a sham battle at home might well distract attention from the stealthy desertion of our allies abroad. And the outcry would have the further incidental advantage of putting frightened liberals out of action and of smearing the whole movement for domestic reform.

I do not suggest that these affairs arranged themselves in the minds of the New Isolationists in quite this Machiavellian way. Still, anyone advocating policies which benefit Communism abroad and win the approbation of Pravda might well be tempted to justify himself to his constituents by redoubling his zeal to extirpate communism at home. This, surely, is the powerful logic of the alliance between Taft and McCarthy. The simple fact is that Taft cannot repudiate McCarthy, because he needs him too much. McCarthyism is an indispensable part of the New Isolationism. Without McCarthyism the New Isolationism would be almost indistinguishable from a policy of appeasement.

The New Isolationism thus has its plausible fa?ade. Senator Taft has his seven points: and one can assume that, if nominated, he will talk in an even more recklessly internationalist vein. He has all the isolationist votes anyway. But, beneath the facade, there remains the reality--the all-out, halfway policy abroad, and at home a state which will refrain from intervening in economic affairs but which will intervene like the devil in the thoughts and opinions of its citizens. The triumph of this policy could lead abroad only to an overflow of Soviet power into the regions from which we retreat--until we are forced back into the Western Hemispheres, or, what is more likely until we perceive what we are doing and then, having invited Soviet expansion, strike back in the panic of total war. And at home we will move steadily into a garrison state, run by men who admire Senator McCarthy and regard his operations as, in Senator Taft's lapidary phrase, "fully justified."

The words of the New Isolationism count less than the deeds: and the deeds shape up into a sinister pattern. The consolation is that this is probably a last convulsive outbreak of an old nostalgia. Once we have exorcised this latest version of isolationism, we may at last begin to live in the twentieth century.



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Хотя Тафт – один из самых уважаемых политических деятелей Америки за всю ее историю, его изоляционистские воззрения осуждены общественным мнением как безусловно ошибочные, и сегодня поэтому его чаще вспоминают скорее противники Рэнда Пола, чем его сторонники. Не настало ли время и России повнимательнее познакомиться с политическим наследием этого человека, чье имя вдруг снова стало актуальным.

Будет ли для нас, как и для всего мира отошедшая от участия в мировых делах Америка, более удобным партнером, чем Америка, решающая все сложные проблемы по своему произволу? Попытаемся на этой неделе вместе с нашими авторами найти ответ на этот непростой вопрос.

* * *

Былые баталии американской политической и околополитической жизни отнюдь не стали позабытыми строчками на страницах покрытых пылью академических фолиантов. Даже в наши дни события более чем семидесятилетней давности по-прежнему не теряют своей остроты и важности, и именно поэтому до сих пор идет непрекращающаяся борьба за интерпретацию этих событий.

Одной из таких тем, которую приходится буквально выскребать из-под многолетних наносов политических ярлыков, идеологических штампов и психологических стереотипов, является тема так называемого «изоляционизма» и подлинных устремлений лидеров этого политического направления.

Традиционно принято считать изоляционистов сторонниками слабой и беззубой политики, готовыми на любые уступки, лишь бы только избежать войны. Однако так ли это было на самом деле?

Колыбелью американского изоляционизма можно считать европейский политический хаос 1920-1930 годов. Версальский мирный договор, завершивший Первую Мировую войну, породил одновременно весь тот сгусток конфликтов и противоречий, которые привели, в конце концов, к пожару Второй Мировой войны. Франция, со времен катастрофы под Седаном ненавидевшая и боявшаяся Германию, шла на все, лишь бы только не дать возродиться противнику за Рейном – но создаваемая за германский счет французская континентальная гегемония совершенно не устраивала Британию.

Заложенная президентом США Вильсоном идея «самоопределения наций» привела к тому, что в Европе появилось множество государств, каждое из которых было на коротком поводке у Франции или Британии, ненавидело соседей, и готово было если не вцепиться в горло, то ударить в спину.

Границы не устраивали ни побежденных, ни победителей, плебисциты о принадлежности тех или иных территорий предварялись террором против «неправильных» соседей. Во время войны ради привлечения и удержания союзников дипломаты не скупились на обещания, одни и те же военные призы были обещаны сразу нескольким претендентам.

Италия считала себя обманутой, полагая, что она получила слишком мало за переход из Тройственного союза на сторону Антанты, словаки и хорваты не понимали, почему они остались без права на самоопределение и оказались под властью чехов и сербов. Не успели высохнуть чернила подписей на мирном договоре, а новые границы уже начали набухать кровью от Балтики до Средиземного моря.

Все считали, что противник одержал победу не в честном бою, а ударом в спину, и победители боялись побежденных. Спешно, по принципу «против кого дружите» создавались и тут же разрывались изнутри союзы, объединявшие вчерашних противников. Государственная политика половины Европы писалась под диктовку иностранных посольств и марши партийных отрядов, сходившихся в уличных боях.

Военные диктатуры из разряда абстрактных политических терминов стали обыденной реальностью демократических республик. Франция и Британия зализывали раны, и, косясь друг на друга, становились «заклятыми друзьями».

Глядя на все это, очень многие американцы полагали европейскую политику особо мутной водичкой, а европейских политиков – лжецами и лицемерами, предающими вчерашних союзников и декларировавшиеся принципы. Кроме этого все более очевидным становилось и то, что вступление Соединенных Штатов в Первую Мировую было обусловлено не только и не столько «борьбой за мир и демократию», сколько интересами корпораций, заработавших баснословные прибыли на войне за океаном.

Те, кто выступал категорически против участия США в делах Европы, кто не желал вновь оказаться в положении оплативших кровью американских солдат прихоти европейских пройдох, кто был против войны для обогащения корпораций – были по-своему правы. Но каково же было настоящее, без пропагандистской маски, лицо тех, кого назвали «изоляционистами»?

* * *

Представители консервативного крыла Республиканской партии – оплота изоляционистского движения – отнюдь не были теми политическими питекантропами, которыми их принято выставлять. Это были сторонники прогресса и развития США, их консерватизм состоял не в том, что они отвергали все новое – такой глупости у них и в мыслях не было – а в том, что они считали демократов и прогрессивную фракцию республиканцев слишком уж активно пришпоривающими лошадей.

В радикализации общества во имя сиюминутного политического выигрыша, в экономии на стратегических планах ради срочной уступки общественному мнению – в этом республиканцы-консерваторы видели опасность потерять Америку и ее дух, опасались, что американцы из нации рискованных авантюристов и первопроходцев, уверенных в собственных силах, превратятся в нацию, зависящую лишь от наполнения социальной кормушки.

Только медленно и упорно соскребая застывший налет пропаганды, начинаешь видеть отсветы тех дней, когда консерваторы, желающие видеть страну сильной и способной постоять за себя, яростно требовали увеличения расходов на реальные программы перевооружения и подготовки войск – а не на содержание бюрократического аппарата и разовые пропагандистские акции. Они были противниками радикального популизма внутри страны и были уверены в том, что деловые интересы США хотя и охватывают весь земной шар, но должны поддерживаться долларами, а не пушками.

Они были уверены, что вооруженные силы нужны для обороны уже занятых позиций, а не для захвата новых – и уж тем более не для обслуживания интересов других стран и интересов корпораций.

Одним из наиболее ярких и сильных представителей консервативной части Республиканской партии был Роберт Альфонсо Тафт, сын президента Уильяма Говарда Тафта. Он пришел в публичную политику весьма поздно, но очень быстро сумел завоевать в партии и в Сенате позиции достаточно серьезные, позиции, позволившие ему уже через два года претендовать на президентскую номинацию от Республиканской партии.

Причина такого успеха сенатора от Огайо крылась в той твердости в убеждениях относительно внутренней политики Соединенных Штатов, которую он высказывал на протяжении всей своей жизни. Именно за эту непреклонность он заслужил прозвище Мистер Республиканец – и его противники считали это прозвище синонимом слова «твердолобый», а сторонники – синонимом слова «несгибаемый».

Рузвельтовская политика Нового Курса, по мнению Тафта, представляла собой нападки на Конституцию и основные американские принципы, и он раз за разом выступал с острой, но конструктивной критикой президентских начинаний.

В области внешней политики патриотическая позиция Тафта нашла свое абсолютное выражение в идее создания «Крепости Америка», то есть, такой системы обеспечения безопасности, которая делала бы невозможными любые действия против США.

Мощный флот двух океанов, мощная стратегическая авиация и хорошо обеспеченная армия – вот что, с точки зрения Тафта, было залогом успеха, и именно поэтому он (вопреки бытующему мифу об изоляционизме) последовательно проводил в Конгрессе курс на усиление военной мощи США. Хотя он выступал резко против оказания помощи Британии, но делал это потому, что в 1939-1940 годах такая помощь могла быть оказана только за счет ослабления обороноспособности США.

При этом одновременно Тафт голосовал за увеличение ассигнований на флот и авиацию и поддерживал решение президента Рузвельта расширить сферу контроля США на половину Атлантики – для него это было, по сути, обеспечением предполья перед бастионами «Крепости Америка».

Разочарованный противодействием со стороны Тафта, один из офицеров британской разведки охарактеризовал его как «ограниченного карлика с подлыми принципами» – хотя он и признал, что Тафт отличается «жестким проницательным умом».

Тафт в равной степени выступал и против неограниченной, в ущерб своим силам, помощи Великобритании и против послевоенной политики «сдерживания коммунизма». Для него и то, и другое было совершенно неразумной и даже вредной тратой ресурсов США на цели, далекие от американских интересов.

Если в начале 1940-х годов рузвельтовские демократы и прогрессивные республиканцы числили Тафта чуть ли не в немецких пособниках, то позже Аверелл Гарриман заявлял, что «Тафт отлично бы следовал в фарватере внешней политики Сталина».

Должно было пройти много лет, американцы должны были пройти через Корею и Вьетнам, чтобы историк Генри Бергер назвал Роберта Тафта консервативным националистом. Потребовалось время, чтобы журналист Николас фон Хоффман назвал политику Тафта «путем к защите страны без ее разрушения, путем к тому, чтобы стать частью мира без претензий на управление оным».

* * *

Хотя в молодости Тафт и слушал профессоров Гарварда, он, однако, остался чужд идеям этих профессоров о том, что Америке предначертано нести идеалы по всему миру. В течение XX века, от Первой Мировой войны до Войны в Заливе, эти гарвардские идеи трансформировались от крестового похода во имя идеалов до походов ради имперских завоеваний, лишь прикрытых лозунгами идеалов.

Ответ Тафта гарвардским теоретикам и вашингтонским практикам был прост: если Соединенные Штаты решат «защищать мир подобно странствующему рыцарю, охраняя своих друзей и идеалы праведной веры», то придется признать, что и противники США имеют право на крестовый поход по распространению своих идей на остальной мир.

Роберт Тафт искренне верил в исключительность американского народа, в то, что идеи, лежащие в основе американского государства, возвышают его над остальным миром, но при этом он был твердо убежден, что «основное назначение внешней политики Соединенных Штатов есть обеспечение свободы нашего народа», а вовсе не построение бескрайней империи по британскому образцу.

Приводя в пример Пуэрто-Рико, он спрашивал – если США не могут «успешно управлять маленьким островом с двумя миллионами населения, то как мы собираемся управлять несколькими миллиардами людей в остальном мире?»

В 1939 году Тафт сделал суровое пророчество о том, что война приведет к «незамедлительному требованию диктаторской власти, неограниченному контролю доходов, цен и продовольствия». За месяц до Перл-Харбора он заявил о своей уверенности в том, что если США вступят во Вторую мировую войну, то «к концу войны право частной собственности в Соединенных Штатах будет в значительной мере уничтожено». Военные мероприятия, настаивал сенатор, сделают президента «полным диктатором над жизнью и собственностью всех наших граждан» – и он оказался прав в своих опасениях.

«Ничто не может уничтожить эту страну», говорил он, «за исключением перерасхода наших ресурсов». Он считал, что защита внешней торговли США или инвестиций в зарубежные страны не оправдывает агрессивную внешнюю политику, и полагал, что вступать в войну со страной лишь потому, что «однажды эта страна может стать успешным конкурентом во внешней торговле – это полностью чуждая американскому народу точка зрения».

В 1943 году Тафт заявил, что одна из целей войны – это гарантировать, что «сила в этом мире не делает правым». В дополнение к сформированной Рузвельтом системе Организации Объединенных Наций, Тафт продвигал идею, согласно которой делегация США могла бы голосовать лишь за резолюции, соответствующие международному праву: он был сторонником международного суда, но не всемирного правительства, опирающегося исключительно на право сильного.

* * *

Говоря об изоляционизме и о людях, стоявших на этих позициях, следует помнить, что впервые эти принципы были провозглашены еще Томасом Джефферсоном.

«Наш первый и фундаментальный принцип, – утверждал Джефферсон ровно 190 лет тому назад, – должен состоять в том, чтобы никогда не впутываться в европейские ссоры. Второй наш принцип – никогда не допускать, чтобы Европа вмешивалась в дела на этой стороне Атлантического океана».

Не следует забывать и слова Чарльза Линдберга, ставшего одним из основных глашатаев комитета America First, объединившего сторонников изоляционизма.

«В лозунгах и пропаганде, которыми наполнено нынешнее военное время, много говориться о Свободе и Демократии. Созданы комитеты для защиты демократии, для помощи демократии, для борьбы за свободу. Президент Рузвельт сказал, что мы должны стать «арсеналом демократии»; что наша миссия – распространять, если понадобиться силой, разные формы свободы по всему миру.

Я тоже верю в свободу и демократию – но не в те их формы, к которым нас сегодня ведёт президент Рузвельт. Демократии нет в стране, народ которой не информирован об основных принципах политики своего правительства. Слово «свобода» звучит насмешкой для людей, которых принуждает к войне президент, избранный ими потому, что он обещал мир.

Если «демократия» хоть что-нибудь означает, она означает право граждан демократического государства быть информированными о главных принципах политики своего правительства, и право определять эти принципы голосованием. Если «свобода» хоть что-нибудь означает, она означает право свободных граждан решать, отправятся ли они воевать и умирать в иностранных войнах.

Если мы не знаем, что делает или собирается делать наше правительство, если мы не имеем права голосовать по вопросу участия в иностранной войне, если наши новости цензурируются и смешиваются с пропагандой, как в тоталитарных странах, если наших граждан призывает на военную службу, а нашу экономику дезорганизует президент, который избирался на первый срок под лозунгами восстановления экономики, а на третий срок под лозунгами мира – значит, в нашей стране больше нет ни демократии, ни свободы.

Мужчины и женщины Массачусетса: свобода и демократия не могут долго существовать без третьего качества – честности. Без честности свобода и демократия становятся только политиканскими ярлыками для американского тоталитарного государства».

Эту речь Линдберг собирался произнести 12 декабря 1941 года в Бостоне. Японская атака Перл-Харбора сделала для миллионов американцев чужую войну своей войной.

Члены и сторонники комитета America First отнюдь не были теми антипатриотами, пособниками врага, противниками американского образа жизни и трусами, которыми их, окатив пропагандистскими помоями, выставили позже. Они не были необразованными и недалекими людьми – комитет создавался гарвардскими студентами, журналистами ведущих изданий, бизнесменами – не только республиканцами, но и демократами.

Они не были ничтожной маргинальной кучкой – в 1941-м году против вмешательства США в войну в Европе выступало 70% американских граждан, в том числе и ньюдилеров – тех, кто поддерживал рузвельтовский курс во внутренней политике. Их нежелание видеть Америку сражающейся за чужие интересы не было капризом, но имело четкое обоснование.

В основе их позиции лежало четыре принципа:

– Соединенные Штаты должны построить неприступную оборону Америки;

– никакая иностранная держава или союз не могут успешно напасть на действительно хорошо подготовленную Америку;

– помощь иностранным государствам не должна вестись в ущерб обороноспособности США,

– в случае войны американская демократия оказывается под угрозой цензуры и государственного диктата.

Они были патриотами своей страны и именно поэтому не желали видеть ее прислужницей денежных мешков и чужих империй. Но когда война коснулась непосредственно США, то среди подавших заявления о добровольном вступлении на воинскую службу были и Чарльз Линдберг – голос America First, и Сарджент Шрайвер – член клана Кеннеди и один из основателей комитета, и даже будущий президент Джон Фитцджеральд Кеннеди, хотя и не состоявший в комитете, но поддерживавший его деньгами как «жизненно важное действие».

Они, вместе с тысячами других американских патриотов, отправились добровольцами в армию, авиацию и на флот. И стоит ли удивляться, что среди ушедших воевать за свою страну был и Роберт Альфонсо Тафт младший – сын и полный тезка того, кто хотел видеть Америку достойной ее силы?


Опубликовано 26 Дек 2015 в 16:00. Рубрика: Международные дела. Вы можете следить за ответами к записи через RSS.
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